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3EDITORIAL NOTE
At the January 1977 meeting of its monthly Economic Seminar
series, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco was honored
to present Prof. Franco Modigliani, Immediate Past President
of the American Economic Association. In his paper, Prof.
Modigliani developed some of the themes which he had first
covered last September in his AEA Presidential Address, "The
Monetarist Controversy - Or, Should We Forsake Stabilization
Policies?" The Bank was doubly fortunate to obtain, as seminar
discussant, Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman, who was serving
as Visiting Scholar at this institution during the winter term.
This supplement to the Bank's Economic Review contains Prof.
Modigliani's lecture, Prof. Friedman's reply, the discussion
between the two and a floor discussion - plus, as an appendix,
Prof. Modigliani's AEA Presidential Address. The seminar was
chaired by Dr. Michael W. Keran, Vice President and Director




Michael Keran: On behalf of the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, I'd like to
welcome you all to our monthly seminar
series.
This month represents the beginning of the
fourth year of this series. The purpose of
these seminars is to bring together profession-
als in the Bay Area business and financial
community with active research workers who
are largely but not entirely from the academic
community, to talk about issues that are of
common concern in areas of public policy and
to which people bring different perspectives.
Today represents the high water mark in
our monthly seminar series because of the
distinguished character of both the discussion
leader, Franco Modigliani, and his discussant,
Milton Friedman.
We will start off with the discussion leader,
Professor Modigliani, spending 30 or 40 min-
utes laying out the issues. This will then be
followed by a comment by Professor Fried-
man on the issues. Then we will open it to
a general exchange of views from the audience.
Franco Modigliani is a professor of econo-
mics and finance at the Sloan School of Man-
agement at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, and is the immediate past presi-
dent of the American Economic Association.
He was born in Rome, studied at the Univer-
sity of Rome, and received his Ph.D. from the
New School of Social Research in New York.
He has taught at the University of Illinois,
the Carnegie Institute of Technology, and
Northwestern University, before he came to
MIT in 1962.
Professor Modigliani is well known for his
research in a wide range of areas. In finance,
he has made state of the art contributions in
the area of cost of capital and the theory of
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investment. In consumer behavior, his name is
associated with the life cycle hypothesis, which
helps to explain personal savings rates. He is
here with us today to talk about one of his
major areas of research interest: monetary
theory and policy. His interest in this topic
goes back to his Ph.D. dissertation published
in 1944, which I suspect all of us in this
room who were ever graduate students in
economics have had to read for macro theory
courses. Since that time, he has not only been
a leading figure in monetary theory, he has
also been an active participant in and an
advisor on monetary policy.
The Federal Reserve has had very close
working relationships with Professor Modig-
liani, particularly because of his role in design-
ing the financial sector of the large econo-
metric model that the Federal Reserve System
uses for its monetary policy simulations.
The topic of Professor Modigliani's paper
today is The Monetarist Controversy, subtitled
"Should We Forsake Stabilization Policies?"
Professor Modigliani: It is a pleasure to be
here today, to enjoy the invigorating air of the
Bay Area, and to enjoy invigorating intellec-
tual exchanges with Professor Friedman. It is
indeed refreshing to realize how much we still
have to argue about. At MIT, everybody
agrees. The differences between us are so puny
that we can understand each other very quickly.
Mr. Keran has mentioned that my initial
work in economics, at least the initial signi-
ficant work, was in the area of understanding
the relation between Keynes and the classics.
And apparently I am destined to end my
career by being concerned with the relation
between Mr. Keynes and Monetarism; and
that is really the subject of my conversation
today. I have been attracted back to this areaduring the 1974 period, because it seemed to
me at that time that everybody who had any
common sense would agree on certain basic
rules of the game, including the fact that when
you get an outside price shock of the magni-
tude experienced in that year, you do need to
relax your money supply rules and allow for
a more rapid growth of the money supply.
I had a. hard time understanding why my
monetarist friends did not agree. I knew, of
course, that it would take quite a bit of
imagination, after having spent their life say-
ing money supply must always grow at the
same rate, to make a change; but I thought
that, given the circumstances, they would.
Monetarists have changed in one very minute
way: they would now target a 5- or 6-percent
increase, while five years ago it would have
been somewhat less. Still they have a very
rigid formulation.
I began to spend time trying to understand
how intelligent people dealing with the same
world, and having presumably similar analyti-
cal tools, should come to such different con-
clusions. I have written a couple of papers
on this topic. One is my presidential address;
another is a paper that I prepared for the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, entitled
"Monetary Policy for the Coming Quarters:
The Conflicting Views." Since you have seen
my presidential address, I shall only summarize
some key issues that I think will be useful
for discussion.
I started out, under the inspiration of
Professor Friedman, to distinguish the sources
of differences: (1) differences in analysis;
(2) differences in empirical assessment of
parameters; and (3) differences in value judg-
ments. The latter may get imported into our
policy prescription without carefully saying
"I'm advising you to do this because I think
you should have low unemployment." And
somebody else, who thinks low unemployment
is not as important, doesn't understand how
you arrived at your conclusions.
Well, let me first say that the conclusion
of my work is very clear: namely, that there
really are no significant differences of analysis
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between able, intelligent, open-minded mone-
tarists and non-monetarists. This is true despite
the fact that very frequently a monetarist
and a non-monetarist will start out approach-
ing thl;lsame problem with somewhat different
models. What I maintain is that, in those cases,
if a monetarist wants to, he will be able to
recast his analysis into a non-monetarist lan-
guage; and the non-monetarist, if he will try,
can recast his analysis into a monetarist
language. And that it will always turn out
that one is consistent with the other, except
possibly in the sense that one is a limiting
case of the other - for instance, a limiting
caSe in which a particular parameter is zero.
Assigning zero value to the parameter is a
particular value; so in this sense, there are
no major differences.
To give an illustration: When a monetarist
describes the relation between money M and
income Y, he'll start by writing Y = aM;
and the non-monetarist will start by writing
M = aY. The monetarist will think that his
equation is a statement about income, and the
non-monetarist will think that his equation is
the demand for money. Yet you can write the
equation either way, and you can also inter-
pret it either way, if you are careful enough.
In particular, a non-monetarist should see -
and I have now learned to do that, so my
blood no longer rises when I sit down to read
the monetarist literature - that the proposition
Y = aM is perfectly consistent with the Key-
nesian framework under a number of condi-
tions. The most trivial one is that "a" is
definitional; that is, there exists, at every
point of time, an "a" such that Y = aM.
So, if a monetarist writes in this sense, and
sometimes he does, there is nothing to get
your blood pressure up.
Secondly, you can write Y = aM in a more
general sense, as a reduced form of the Hicks
IS-LM curve, provided you are careful to note
that, in that case, "a" is either a function
of interest rates - or, if you don't want to
use interest rates, then "a" is a function of
output. Of course, recognizing that makes a
lot of difference, because then the derivativeof "Y" with respect to "M" does depend on
how the effect of "M" is distributed between
price P and output X. It makes a lot of
difference because then "a" is not a constant,
but depends onM in ways which the equation
Y = aM cannot account for.
Finally, suppose that, sticking to this last
case, you happen to believe that what I've
called the lIicksian mt:chanism is very power-
ful. Then to a good approximation "a" is a
constant - or, at any rate, is a random var-
iable. Its value may move a little bit, but not
as a function of what you are doing. Even
if it does, it is a secondary effect; so, for
many purposes, you may want to take it as
a constant.
I maintain that, by the same token, a
monetarist should be willing to take the tra-
ditional two equations of the non-monetarist
Hicksian framework (which sometimes be-
comes two thousand equations), and see that
the Hicksian framework is consistent with
his model.
So it seems to me that the framework is
the same, and that the real issue has to do,
on the one hand, with assessment of the value
of the parameters; and, on the other hand,
on assessment of the crucial simplifications
that are appropriate at different times. With
respect to the latter, I think any intelligent
non-monetarist will agree that if you are deal-
ing with the post-World War I German infla-
tion (or I would even say with the British
or Italian inflation of this time), the Hick-
sian mechanism is a refinement that we can
forget about. However, I wish the monetarist
would understand that if you are dealing with
the Great Depression, then the constancy of
"a" is a luxury that you cannot use. It is
a convenient approximation which is no
longer useful. For that reason, when either a
monetarist or a non-monetarist deals with ex-
treme situations, he should have no difficulty
coming to similar conclusions.
I have just been working on a paper deal-
ing with the problem of the Italian inflation,
and I'm sure that Milton would be willing to
sign his name to it. I conclude that you can
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only maintain a certain rate of inflation if
the money supply is growing at the appropri-
ate rate. If you stop the money supply from
growing, you cannot for long have any signi-
ficant inflation as etnployment.tends to shrink
to some critical level consistent with price
stability.
Note that Italy has a fairly stable Phillips
curve, because the economY is indexed 100
percent, and contracts are highly centralized.
In this context, expectations have no role.
Thus it turns out that you can keep employ-
ment above the critical level; but, because, at
the. higher level of employment prices that
firms charge are not consistent with the wage
demanded, you get a higher rate of inflation.
The larger the level of output the greater the
discrepancy between wages and prices, and the
higher the inflation. However, even this Phil-
lips curve is unstable in the longer run, be-
cause it relies entirely on the lag in the es-
calator clause of wage adjustment behind
prices. So high employment is made possible
because the real wage is reduced through the
inflation. But workers must at some point
catch on, and must either agree to a lower
real wage, or must try to shorten the es-
calator lag - in which case, inflation would
grow; and so you do have an explosive in-
flation.
So you see that when we are dealing with
concrete problems, non-monetarists can come
to quite monetarist conclusions.
Then the question is: Where is the main
source of difference? Is it in empirical as-
sessment? I have indicated that essentially, at
the start, there was a great difference of em-
pirical assessments, with the monetarist think-
ing that the Hicksian mechanism is very
powerful, while the early Keynesians thought
it was rather powerless. I guess I've always
been between the two positions, although I
would say that I have moved toward the view
that the power of the Hicksian mechanism
is sizable, unless you get into a really deep
depression.
The assessments that come out of the MPS
model and many other models agree, at leastin terms of order of magnitude, that the
double mechanism, the Hicksian mechanism
and the price flexibility mechanism, put to-
gether, really does reduce considerably the
impact of outside disturbances.
Just to remind you of what happens in
terms of the MPS model, we find that if you
have an exogenous disturbance to demand, the
multiplier far from being a gigantic number
is reasonably small; it is not quite one, to
begin with; then it gets to a maximum of two,
and then stays there. But that assumes per-
fect price rigidity. Once you allow for the
fact that prices gradually respond to unemploy-
ment, then you do find that the maximum
impact is reached in about a year; it is not
much over one, and then it dies out. After
a couple ofyears, the net effect is zero.
On the other hand, the effect in terms of
money income must be appreciatively larger
if prices are responding. It is at this point
that there has been some difficulty with some
monetarists, because of what I call the St.
Louis quandary. According to the St. Louis
equation, which is estimated in terms of money
income, the fiscal effect would last two quar-
ters and disappear after that. I have always
felt that result was inconsistent with any sen-
sible monetarist point of view. I am pleased
to say that I've never heard Milton quite
endorse that result - particularly since he is
known to emphasize the fact that the respon-
siveness of prices is slow. In other words, with
his distribution of the change in income be-
tween output and prices, the price component
is sluggish. If that is the case, how could you
not get a fairly long diffused effect?
In my presidential address, I have mentioned
a number of tests which resolve the issue to
my satisfaction. I think the St. Louis results
are not inconsistent with what a non-monetarist
would expect, a priori. The apparent difference
is due, first of all, to the fact that the
St. Louis approach is unreliable. You can get
almost any answer, if you play around with
that equation. That's understandable, given
the many variables you are leaving out. The
St. Louis equation attempts to explain income
8
with just two variables, fiscal policy and
money, when in fact there are two thousand
other things that are whipping it around. So
to pretend that you can explain fiscal influ-
ences with simple short lags, and particularly
ignoring the distinction between real income
and money, is just to ask too much. You get
a very poor fit, and you get poor estimates -
estimates that are highly unreliable. i have
"shown this to be the case, by two approaches.
One, suggested by a student of mine, Dan
O'Neill, is an F test, which shows that the
difference between the St. Louis coefficient
and the coefficient which you estimate from a
model like the MPS is not significant, most of
the time, for most ofthe tests I have made.
Secondly, and perhaps more interestingly,
by showing that the fiscal multipliers estimated
from the MPS model are more reliable than
the St. Louis estimate. To this end I took
the St. Louis equation, estimated the co-
efficients of the fiscal variables through 1969
and extrapolated. I got worse results than if
I extrapolated a St. Louis equation in which
the fiscal coefficients were set equal to the
MPS coefficients, which have never changed
in time. I get a better fit outside the sample
period, which simply means that their estimate
is not very reliable. In other words, the St.
Louis coefficients give a closer fit during the
period of estimation, but when you extrapo-
late - they go to pieces.
The reason, by the way, why the extra-
polation is so poor, is the following: When
you refit the St. Louis equation for a longer
and longer period, the estimates tend to get
closer and closer to those implied by the MPS
and other econometric models. Indeed, Ben
Friedman has just finished and submitted a
paper in which he shows that if you go
through 1976, and particularly if you go from
1960 to 1976, the coefficients of the govern-
ment expenditure variable in the St. Louis
equation are essentially the dream of a non-
monetarist. They are essentially two, and they
never become negative. They start positive and
they always remain positive. This may actually
be too good to be true, because my own esti-mate is that they ought to be not quite as
high as that; so even these are not very re-
liable. But what this evidence really shows is
the unreliability of a method whose coeffi-
cients keep changing as you move along.
But while there is by now relatively little
theoretical disagreement, I suspect that when
we apply our conclusions to the real world
perhaps each side tends to forget that he has
admitted his earlier faults of exaggerating in
one direction or another. For instance, I heard
Milton say again, just before this seminar,
that a tax cut which is not accompanied
by a change in money has "almost" no effect.
I think I know what "almost" means. It
means that in the first year it has an effect
of something like half. But that does not
sound to me like "almost" nothing. Or per-
haps he is somehow disagreeing with what I
thought he agreed to in theory.
Of course, there are situations where Mil-
ton and I would agree that the fiscal effects
are almost zero; namely, a transient tax cut
which is stated to be transient, and which
everybody knows is transient. I think there is
strong reason to believe that it will produce
no effect; and I have been fascinated by
studying the evidence that comes out of the
latest experience we have had in 1975. That
is a fascinating experience; because that tax
rebate was as transient as you can get. In
one quarter we reduced taxes at the annual
rate of some $32 billion. The next quarter, we
raised taxes at the same annual rate. Will
people behave as if they had lost $30 billion
of income permanently in the first quarter,
and gained $30 billion the next quarter?
The evidence seems to me strikingly against it.
The amount of savings went up by $37 bil-
lion in the first quarter, and went down by
$24 billion the next quarter. A close examina-
tion of this episode led me to the conclusion
that people treated the rebate as a one-time
gift, and spent it as dribble. You don't see
much evidence of an effect either in the same
quarter or in the immediately following ones.
Let me indicate, since I mentioned this,
that of course I am now touching on one
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point in which Milton and I see eye-to-eye,
and that is the theory of consumption. This
is an area in which our work complements
each other beautifully. It seems to me that
his work had a great impact beyond mine,
at the methodological level, by showing the
relationship between theory and tests, and how
you define under what conditions a theory
would be rejected. This has a lot of carry-
over to problems other than consumption.
On the other hand, my model doesn't have
much carry-over, because it is specific to the
life cycle. It is like Milton's permanent income
hypothesis; but life is finite. There are all kinds
of fascinating consequences that come out of
my approach which you could not convenient-
ly derive from his model. And so it really
pushes in one direction - in that particular
direction I think quite far.
Let me now return to the question: If
there is no difference in analysis, how can
we disagree? Well, before we come to value
judgments, there is still a difference, an em-
pirical difference, which Milton has stressed in
the past. And, by the way, I must give
credit to Milton for having said many times
that the differences are empirical. The em-
pirical difference essentially is this: the mone-
tarists' belief that, whatever the coefficients
are on the average, they are very unstable;
and that since you are dealing with a dyna-
mic system you don't really have enough
knowledge to stabilize the economy.
Actually, at this level, Milton has in my
view made a grave mistake; he has tried to
establish as a logical proposition that you can-
not stabilize the economy. I say that is a
mistake because as he has stressed, these are
not logical differences. You know his logical
argument - he stated in his presidential
address that the Phillips curve is vertical at
the natural rate of unemployment, and we
don't know exactly where that is located.
If we are anywhere on one side or the other
of the natural rate, we have a cumulative
process of either inflation or deflation. There-
fore to try to stabilize unemployment can only
result in extreme instability.I am very proud of my analogy, which
some of you may have seen in the footnote,
that says this sounds just like advising a man
in Minneapolis, who wants to go down to New
Orleans,along the following lines: "Look
here, there are two ways to go. I know you
are trying to go by car; but there is only
one waY to go that is sure. You should put
yourself in a tub and drift down the river.
Because we know that the Mississippi River
has a current, you can't fail to get there
eventually. Whereas, if you take the car, you
might make a wrong turn, and you might
end up in Alaska. You might catch pneumo-
nia. You might never get there."
It seems to me that it is exactly the same
argument. Let me make it specific. There are
circumstances in which taking the tub down
the Mississippi is better than taking an auto-
mobile; suppose for instance, the automobile
is a wagon, and there are lots of Indians in
the way, whereas the Mississippi is secured by
your friendly troops. Well, in that case, I
would say the tub is a good idea.
Or let me take another example, which I
think is pertinent. Suppose you don't want to
go to New Orleans, but just wish to visit
somebody a few miles down river, and you
don't exactly know the road and haven't got
a map. In that case, you might find that it
is more reliable to take the tub. The moral:
a) you should not try to use stabilization poli-
cies for fine tuning; but b) it is a different
matter when you have a long trip; and I sub-
mit that our knowledge of the economy is
sufficient to make the situation far closer to
the automobile in a friendly country than to
Milton's wagon in Indian country.
In any event, what I am really saying is that
this is an empirical question. Of course, it
may be that if you have nothing but a con-
stant money supply in the longest run you
may eventually get there; but it doesn't mean
that on the average you will not be far away
from target. That is just an empirical matter
of how well your stabilization works, and
how serious is the risk of major errors.
Now, I have tried to face the problem as
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an empirical one, and I have tried, in my
paper, to provide a good deal of evidence
that suggests, on the one hand, that a con-
stantmQney supply does not work wen; and,
on the other hand, that stabilization policies
have worked well. I'm sure there will be some
room for discussion on this point.
Idohave something to say about value
judgments. Just a few words. I think there
is no question but that value judgments
play a major role in the differences between
economists. And I think it is unfortunate, but
true, that value judgments end up by playing
a role in your assessment of parameters and
of the evidence we consider. And here, let me
remind you of one very important develop-
ment of recent years: We have all learned
about Bayesian statistics and Bayesian infer-
ence rules. Now, in one sense, Bayesian statis-
tics and inference is a very good approach
to problems; but it has its drawbacks. And
there is no question that Milton and I, look-
ing at the same evidence, may reach different
conclusions as to what it means. Because, to
him, it is so clear that government interven-
tion is bad that there cannot be an occasion
where it was good! Whereas, to me, govern-
ment discretion can be good or bad. I'm quite
open-minded about that, and am -therefore
willing to take the point estimate. He will not
take the point estimate; it will have to be a
very biased estimate, before he will accept it.
It is very important to understand the
sources of differences; there is no question
that, in the advice we have been giving at
different times, we value differently the cost
of unemployment versus, let's say, the cost
of inflation. I must say that I, among non-
monetarists, am particularly sensitive to the
cost of inflation; and, in fact, the last part
of my paper deals precisely with the question
of how to respond to inflation when you think
it is costly. The literature on the cost of
inflation has been waylaid by trivia about the
little triangle due to the fact that, when inter-
est rates rise, you economize on the use of
money. I think that is trivia since, with re-
spect to most of the money (namely, demanddeposits). we could eliminate that loss imme-
diately by just letting interest rates be paid on
it. Once you have done. that, the only .thing
left is currency; and that is a small quantity,
and we can probably invent ways of saving
on that. too - credit cards, and what not.
So I think that is really trivial.
The real costs of inflation are. I think,
related to unexpected changes. I believe that
steady inflation (and I think Milton would not
disagree with this) has almost zero cost. There
is to be sure a very small welfare triangle;
but it's pretty trivial; and almost any other
cost you can mention, I think even that can
be taken care of. If we lived in a world of
steady state inflation, I'm sure we could find
ways of making its cost pretty negligible. So
I think that what is really costly about infla-
tion is unexpected deviations of inflation
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from the anticipated steady state path. This is
the problem that I have tried to address. If
yOll findyo\.l.rselfoff the long-run target on
the Phillips curve, because of unexpected
events, such as the.oil crisis, or because of
errors in policy such as the Vietnam War and
the•way it \vas financed, how do you return
to the long-run path? That, I think, is a very
important problem; and I wish that rnorie~
tarists and non-monetarists could join forces
in the interesting task of estimating what are
the costs of being off the long-run path.
What are the costs of taking longer to get
there? Is it the change in the price level that
matters? Or is it the rate of inflation, per se?
I think these are fascinating questions, which
should provide a common ground for mone-
tarists and non-monetarists alike.
Thank you.